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My dear Sir 
I thank you much for the copy of your bill and the printed observations 
explanatory of your Bill which you have been so kind as to forward to me 
and which have been sent to me from Melbourne. They are full of matters 
of the highest interest and at this time of supreme importance for all 
Australian politicians. I must confine myself however, to the particular 
subject referred to in the latter part of your observations to which you 
direct my attention. I believe you are correct in saying that you are the 
first to call attention to it publicly - I do not remember any writer or 
politician in Victoria at least who has mentioned it made it the basis of 
an argument connected with the nature and character of our Constitution. 
I will say at once that I venture to differ from the views you propound on 
this question, and that I should deem it on all grounds, theoretical & 
practical, to be a grave mistake if the sug,gestion embodied in your Bill 
founded on those views should be adopted by the Federal Conventron - The 
form used in the Constitution of the majority of these colonies, NS 
Wa:les, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia by which the Queen is 
represented as one part of the Legislature, appears to me to recognise 
the Chief and an essential Constitutional tie between Great Britain and 
the self governing dependencies of Great Britain. With the exception of 
the appeal from our courts of law to the Queen in Council it is indeed the 
sole tie, and if both of these ties be removed I do not know of any 
restraining or controHing power remaining to the Imperial Government 
that would justify it in continui.ng to acknowledge the responsibility 
under which it undoubtedly now lies to other independent States for acts 
of the legislatures of governments of dependencies which would in law 
and in fact have then ceased to be dependencies. The form adopted by the 
majority of the Australian Constitutions distinctly and accurately 
expressed the essential fundamental fact of our legal retention of 
dependence on the BrWsh Crown and of the limitation of our rights of 
legislation springing from that relation. This is an all sufficient reason 
for retaining this form so long -as we are not prepared to assume the 
burden of independence. 
I do not understand you, however, to wish that the power of disallowance 
of Australian Acts of Parliaments should be taken away from the Crown, 
but you would represent the power as an executive function of the 
Imperial Government, and not as a power exercised by the Crown as one 
branch of the Federal and Provincial legislatures. But this view if it 
were adopted in legislation and acted upon would appear to justify and 
might lead to very dangerous interference by the Imperial Government 
with our legislation from its initial stage down to the time of 
reservation of Bills for the Royal assent. 
We have had experience of such interference in Victoria - when 
protection legislation was first introduced in the Victorian legislation, 
Mr Cardwell, the Secretary of State for the colonies, wrote a series of 
despatches, threatening to the Governor and insulting to his ministers, to 
whom the Governor was instructed to show them, with the view of 
preventing the introduction of such measures. The action of the 
Secretary of State was illegal and unconstitutional, but it had a 
powerful effect at the time. If your suggestion was adopted, it might be 
argued with some force that as the act of the Crown in assenting to or 
dissenting from Bills was only an executive act, the imperial advisers of 
the Crown would be justified in instructing their agent the Governor to 
try to prevent the passing of bills which they might be induced by secret 
influence to condemn. The bare possibility of such influence being 
exercised would have the worst effects. 
The legal character of this part of the Constitution of Victoria is easily 
understood. The ground of it is obvious to everyone who admits that 
Victoria is a dependency of the British Crown. Its operation has been, 
except at the period of our history I have refered to, free from friction 
and controversy. Under it the Governor as the Representative of the 
Crown and not as the agent of the Imperial Ministers of the Crown, 
assents to · certain Bills. He reserves others in accordance with 
established general instructions authorised by the Imperial Constitution 
Statute to be given to him by the Imperial Ministers, and the Crown is 
advised by its Imperial Advisers in respect of Bills so reserved to assent 
to or dissent from them on grounds of imperial policy only which do not 
come under consideration until the colonial stage of legislation has been 
passed, and which, in the event of the Royal assent being withheld have 
to be publicly assigned and justified. 
Your suggestion, if adopted would establish a difference between the 
form of Federal legislation and the prevailing form of Provincial 
_ legislation, and this difference would undoubtedly give rise sooner or 
later to controversy and speculation with regard to the legal status -and 
powers of both the Federal and Provincial legislatures. Our experience 
in Victoria has made our politicians acquainted with the enormous waste 
of time and of political energy occasioned by controversy of this kind 
which is perpetual because the matter in dispute can never be 
determined by recognised authority. It were better, in my opinion that 
there should be no federation for the present than that we should 
institute a Federal Constitution that would create new doubts and lead to 
new and better and ceaseless controversy. I am prepared to go further 
and to hazard the prediction that the Federal Convention will result in a 
grievous and lasting failure if it does not use the grand opportunity it 
possesses of removing the ignorance and doubts that now prevail 
respecting the Constitutional rights and powers (including the limits of 
those rights and powers) of the several Australian Provinces. If the 
preponderance of opinion be in favour of retaining in the proposed Federal 
Constitution the English system of responsiJble government, not 
withstanding its acknowledged defects and disadvantages, why should 
not that system be adopted by express words in its entirety? And would 
any valid reason be urged against the expediency of explaining and 
interpreting in an identical sense and by means of express declaratory 
provision the true !legal meaning of other Constitution Acts of all the 
Provinces of Australia included in the Federation? If this were done the 
peoples of these Colonies would soon come to understand the real nature 
not only of the Federal Constitution but of their own. The Federal 
Constitution and the Provincial Constitutions would explain and support 
one another. The subject matter of each woul'd be well defined if, as 
happily seems probable, the Convention should determine on giving to the 
Federal Government only such enumerated powers as the various 
Provinces may be willing to concede to it. There would then be small 
danger of conflict of jurisdictions or diversity of practice. Both the 
Dominion and the Provinces would be founded on the same constitutional 
principles, namely responsibility to Parliament, as regards Ministers or 
the Executive Government and the exclusive control by the representative 
body of the Legislature of taxation and finance as regards legislation. 
I write in haste and cannot do more than indicate generally the grounds 
on which my answer to your question rests. 
Allow me in conclusion to say that you and alii your colleagues in the 
Convention have my warm sympathy and my best wishes for your success 
in the noble and very difficult work on which you are engaged. I will add 
that enduring success will entirely depend, in my opinion, upon the 
degree in which you shall be able to enact in clear words and apply to the 
Dominion and to the several Provinces of Australia the principles which 
determine the relations of the two Houses of the Legislature and the 
legal position and _action of the Executirve Government of England. 
I am my dear Sir 
Yours faithfully 
Geo [George] Higinbotham 
The Honourable A. Inglis Clark 








